This paper reviews the major work done to explain the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks. Difficulties with the existing theories are also reviewed. The work of Tinic (1988) which suggests that IPO underpricing results from the need for "legal insurance" is tested and no such effect can be found. A simple framework is then developed which points to the reputation capital of investment bankers as the major cause of IPO underpricing. Empirical findings from the sample of IPOs in New Zealand are consistent with the implications of the model.
INTRODUCTION
Underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks has been documented in a number of studies. An investor who subscribes to an IPO at the offer price and sells soon after the shares are publicly traded can earn on average an excess return of more than 15% in the United States (Smith 1986) , and more than 28% in both the Australian (Finn and Higham 1988) and New Zealand (Cheung and Vos 1990) share markets. A number of theories have evolved to explain the peculiar observation. The major contributions to understanding IPOs and their detractors are reviewed. Tinic (1988) suggests that legal liability contributes to underpricing. The legal environment of New Zealand provides a chance to test Tinic's "legal insurance"
effect. This paper examines Tinic's work and compares the legal environment of IPOs in New Zealand with that in the United State and presents the New Zealand empirical evidence which casts doubt on Tinic's "legal insurance" effect.
A postulate that IPO underpricing is a consequence of the reputation capital of investment bankers is presented. This is due to the potential damage to the reputation of an investment banker caused by pricing the issue at or above the expected value of the after market price distribution outweighing the extra income which can be earned. The implications of this hypothesis, which are consistent with most of the findings in previous works, are also tested with a sample of IPOs in New Zealand.
THEORIES OF IPO UNDERPRICING
Asymmetric Information Between Issuer and Investment Banker Baron (1982) assumes information asymmetry between the issuer and the investment banker. He argues that the investment banker knows more about the demand of the IPO issue in the capital market than the issuer, hence it will be optimal for the issuer to delegate the offer price decision to the banker. Moreover, the issuer is unable to monitor perfectly the distribution effort expended by the banker. The offer price determined under such a setting will be lower than the one which would prevail in the absence of the information asymmetry and/or the observability problems.
Baron's study does not address why issuers do not choose a banker who has a record of pricing unseasoned issues more fully. In other words, the issue of why underpricing is not eliminated by competition among investment bankers is not resolved. Also Baron's hypothesis is not supported by empirical evidence. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) examine the IPOs of 38 investment banking firms which went public in [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] . These bankers also participated in the distribution of their own IPOs. The information asymmetry and observability problems should disappear in such instances. However, statistically significant underpricing comparable to other IPOs was still present in these self-marketed offerings.
Asymmetric Information Amongst Investors
Instead of information asymmetry between investment banker and issuer, Rock (1986) However, when an IPO is underpriced, both types of investors participate and rationing of shares may occur due to oversubscription. The uninformed investors will thus receive proportionately fewer of the "good" issues and more of the "bad"
issues than the informed investors. This will discourage the uninformed investors from participating in the new issue market unless the offer price falls far enough below the expected realized price to compensate for the bias in shares allocation. Ritter (1984) Underpricing as a Signalling Device Allen and Faulhaber (1989) suggest that promising firms signal their type by underpricing their IPOs, and investors know only the best can recoup the cost of the signal from subsequent issues. The idea is that underpricing the IPO would leave a good taste in investors' mouths so that future issues from the same issuer could be sold at attractive prices.
The signalling hypothesis has neglected some fundamental issues. As in Rock's model, the investment banker is there only to market and distribute the shares, with no decision-making role to play. This is unlikely since an investment banker also has reputation and money at stake in underwriting an IPO. Moreover, to assume that the cost of signalling can be recouped from subsequent issues is to assume a certain degree of market inefficiency, i.e. that subsequent shares of the firm can be sold at higher than expected prices than shares of equivalent risk. In addition, there is nothing to prevent the type of opportunistic behaviour of IPO investors which drives them to purchase the unseasoned shares in the first place.
The fact that they have taken the first tasty bite for a discounted price does not guarantee they will pay a premium for the second bite, when there are equally tasty delicacies around for a lower price. There is no reason or obligation for the investor to compensate the firm for the signalling cost.
UNDERPRICING AS INSURANCE AGAINST LEGAL LIABILITIES
Tinic's (1988) Study Tinic (1988) explores one of the ideas pointed out in Ibbotson (1975) Before empirically examining IPO underpricing in New Zealand, it is helpful to understand a reputation based model as having explanatory significance as one factor driving IPO underpricing.
A REPUTATION MODEL OF UNDERPRICING
Reputation of investment bankers has been cited as a factor in IPO underpricing, albeit a subsidiary one, in both Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Tinic (1988) . Beatty and Ritter establish the underpricing result using Rock's information asymmetry framework, then argue that the underpricing equilibrium is enforced by investment bankers who have their reputation capital at stake. Tinic proposes underpricing as a form of insurance against legal liabilities and the associated damages to the reputations of investment bankers, but concentrates on the legal liabilities aspect without examining the implications of the reputation side. The idea that the reputation capital of investment bankers is the primary force which drives IPO underpricing needs further explanation.
The Setting and the Issuer's Consideration
In the model proposed here, it is assumed that the issuer is risk averse and hence demands an underwritten issue. Suppose both issuer and investment banker know and agree that the possible outcomes of the realized market price P of the issue have a symmetric density function with mean Pe and standard deviation σ.
Also assume that the issuer has a "reservation" price Pmin below which the issue will not proceed. In other words, the issuer demands a minimum net dollar proceed of Pmin$N, where N is the number of shares offered. With an offer price Po, the underwriter charges an all-inclusive commission rate of C(Po) per share. The expected per share cost to the issuer given Po , or E(H/Po), is:
The cost to the issuer has two components, the commission C(Po)$Po paid to the underwriter plus the expected cost of the underpricing (Pe-Po). The issuer may be willing to trade off a higher commission rate with a lower expected cost of underpricing if the underwriter is willing to underwrite the issue at a higher offer price.
The Underwriter's Consideration
Suppose the entire IPO issue is underwritten by the underwriter. The pay-off to the underwriter, as developed in Appendix A, results from balancing extra commission revenue and risk of under-subscription.
The underwriter, by setting the offer price at Pe rather than Po, can extract part of the additional proceeds received by the issuer ( N$(Pe -Po)) in the form of a higher commission, N@{C(Pe)$Pe-C(Po)$Po}. In return, the underwriter is assuming a higher risk of losing future income due to a tarnished reputation, in the amount of Pr(Po<P<Pe)$R, should the realized market price turn out to be lower than the offer price. In other words, the underwriter will consider the cost and benefit of underpricing. If the expected cost of extra risk of a damaged reputation outweighs the benefit of extra income, the issue will be underpriced. The implications of this reputation hypothesis will be examined in the section below. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS IN THE NEW ZEALAND MARKET

Data
Methodology
The excess return Xit is computed for each IPO i in each time period t. Xit is defined as :
where Wit and Wmt are respectively the returns on unseasoned issue security i and the market index over the time period t. The two time periods used are the periods from offer date to list date and list date to one month hence. The average excess return Xt is then defined as the simple arithmetic average of all Xits for time
Since the returns of this sample of IPOs are only market-adjusted but not riskadjusted, the average excess return from list date to one month hence is also Ten firms in the sample have identical offer and list date prices. They were likely to be thinly traded firms with no transactions taking place in the first days of trading. However, this cannot be ascertained since there is no data available on volume of trades. Hence these firms are included in the sample. The exclusion of these firms would raise the degree of underpricing by about 3%, rendering the underpricing results more significant. 
Some Implications and Empirical Results of the Reputation Hypothesis
One consistent finding in various studies is that "risky" issues (as measured by expost data) are more underpriced than less risky ones. This finding is consistent with the reputation hypothesis. Other things being equal, given two IPOs which differ only in their standard deviations, an underwriter needs to underprice the one with a larger standard deviation more in order that the expected damage to its reputation remains the same. For instance, by setting the offer price at one standard deviation below the mean in order to reduce the probability of a damaged reputation, an underwriter would have to set a lower price for the issue with the larger standard deviation.
Size of issue is used here as a proxy for risk. All 149 issues were ranked by issue size from the smallest to the largest issue. The average degree of underpricing is compared between the lower quartile and the upper quartile. A procedure similar to the one used in Table 3 is employed to test the equality of the means from the two quartiles. The difference between the two means, shown in Table 4 , is significantly different from zero at the 0.1 level, supporting the reputation hypothesis. The reputation hypothesis also implies that other things being equal, the same issue will be more underpriced if underwritten by a more prestigious underwriter than a fringe underwriter, since the expected cost of a damaged reputation is larger for the prestigious underwriter. This may seem at odds with Tinic's (1989) finding that the prestigious underwriters have priced IPOs more fully than the fringe underwriters in the post-1933 period in the United States. However, his data also indicated market segmentation whereby prestigious underwriters avoided speculative small issues during that same period. In other words, it is likely that prestigious underwriters underpriced their IPOs less than fringe underwriters because the IPO issues they underwrote were less risky, rather than because the potential threat of legal liabilities was less for prestigious underwriters.
We were able to trace the names of underwriters in 80 IPOs in our sample. iii
These 80 IPOs were sorted by their issue size and put into four groups of equal number. The first group consisted of the smallest 20 issues while the fourth group consisted of the 20 largest. Again size of the issue was used as a proxy for risk.
Since the reputation of underwriter at the time of issue was the variable of concern, two IPO underwriters "league tables" covering the periods 1979-85 and 1986-91 were constructed, using the total size of issues underwritten as the criteria. The rank was used as a proxy for the reputation of the underwriter for that IPO. For instance, Fay Richwhite Co. was assigned a reputation index of 10 for the IPOs underwritten in the 1979-85 period since Fay Richwhite was ranked 10th in terms of the total size of issues underwritten in that period. Appendix B contains the league tables and the rank of underwriters in the two periods.
Least squares linear regressions were performed for each group as well as for the whole sample of 80 IPOs with the reputation index as the independent variable and the percentage amount of underpricing as the dependent variable. The results, summarized in Table 5 , present evidence that for small issues the degree of underpricing is positively correlated with the reputation of the underwriter.
Regression results show that the dependence is significant at the 0.01 level for the group with the smallest issue size, marginally significant at the 0.1 level for the next smallest size group, while it is non-existent for the third and fourth groups with the larger issue size. The coefficient is also insignificant for the sample as a whole. If reputable underwriters are more cautious towards riskier than safer issues, and fringe underwriters are equally aggressive in all IPOs, then the above results are expected. For small and risky issues, the difference in pricing between the two types of underwriters would be significant, reflecting the larger expected cost of a damaged reputation of the prestigious underwriters. However, the pricing difference would be much smaller and hence more difficult to detect for large and safe issues. In the extreme case where there is no risk whatsoever of overpricing an IPO issue, both types of underwriters would price the issue fully and charge the issuer the highest commission possible, and no difference in pricing would be detected. Another important consideration is that although there are differences in the reputation capital of underwriters in New Zealand, the difference is much less distinct than in other larger economies. The expected benefit (in the form of extra commission income) of pricing a large issue more fully may well overwhelm any expected cost of damaged reputation. Therefore one would expect to find a more prominent reputation effect in a sample of IPOs in the United States since there are more "giant" underwriters with a huge amount of reputation capital at stake. In any case the sample of IPO data in New Zealand does cast additional doubt on Tinic's legal insurance argument iv and provides support for the reputation hypothesis.
Other studies have also provided empirical evidence that reputations of underwriters matter. Beatty and Ritter (1986) have documented the relationship between underwriters' mispricing of unseasoned issues and the subsequent change in their market shares. It was found that underwriters who priced the issues too high or too low from the market norm lost on average 22% of their market shares subsequently. Shiller (1990) A reputation model of underpricing is also developed. The empirical evidence in New Zealand is consistent with the implications of the reputation hypothesis.
Further investigations in other markets of reputation as the primary cause of underpricing would yield fruitful results.
APPENDIX A
The pay-off, I, to the underwriter given a particular offer price Po is: 
where P o> = E(P/P$Po) and P o< = E(P/P<Po) Similarly, the expected income given an offer price Pe is: E(I/Pe) = C(Pe)$Pe$N -Pr(P<Pe)$R
since Pr(P$Pe)@(P e> -Pe) + Pr(P<Pe)$(P e< -Pe)=0 for a symmetric distribution with mean Pe.
Further, assume that the underwriter will not choose an offer price Po above Pe. In other words, the underwriter will not intentionally overprice the issue. This is of obvious interest to the underwriter in order to protect against the underwriting risk and also the risk of losing confidence among investors. Therefore the underwriter has to decide on an offer price Po between Pmin and Pe. We could gain some insights into the decision making process by looking at the difference in expected income if the issue is being priced at Po rather than Pe (Pmin < Po < Pe):
E(I/Po)-E(I/Pe) = Pr(Po<P<Pe)$R +(1-d(Po))@N@{Pr(P$Po)@(P o> -Po)+Pr(P<Po)$(P o< -Po)} -N@{C(Pe)$Pe-C(Po)$Po}
The second term is likely to be insignificant for "extreme" values of Po. For low levels of Po (close to Pmin), demand for the shares will be high and d(Po) will be close to 1. For values of Po close to Pe, the expression Pr(P$Po)@(P o> -Po)+Pr(P<Po)$(P o< -Po) will be close to zero. The idea is that when an issue is clearly underpriced it is likely to be fully subscribed, and there is minimal underwriting risk involved. When the issue is priced close to its expected value, the expected deviation from the offer price of the unsold shares held by the underwriter is close to zero no matter what d(Po) is. Hence, in cases where the degree of underpricing is significant (e.g. in Australia and New Zealand where on
